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Audification, sonification, musification, auditory display — audio realisation of non-audio data is itself 
phenomenological, it is as Heidegger (1926) states: “to let that which shows itself to be seen from itself in the 
very way in which it shows itself from itself,” and it is precisely when the phenomena is “uncovered” that 
questions begin to form with regards to the process of sonification’s status within creative arts practice. 
Rigour of method within a sonification facilitates a realisation that is prescript: method as composition, instruction 
as notation and adherence as realisation. Whilst finding congruence with algorithmic composition, within musical 
praxis sonification is isolated. Internality of the subsequently realised sound or music is not only absent, realised 
sound or music as perceivable externality can be described as functional so far as it contains data, in which case 
the qualities of a sonification are arguably “cheesecake”. Qualitative compositional decisions — for example, 
wherein sound or music that exists first as heard within internal consciousness (as with Husserlian “phantasy”) is 
brought forth as perceivable externality, or wherein sonic intention (as opposed to the internal heard) is met 
through definition and completion of algorithmic construct — are discounted in favour of integrity of process 
toward quantifiable outcome. This is to say: sonification is an objective creative praxis; success of a sonification 
is quantifiable, it is measured against representational accuracy. However, as a music practitioner, I seek to embed 
my practice within quantifiable accuracy of sonification only to subsequently liberate qualitative compositional 
decisions. Within this paper it is not intended to conclude sonification as quantifiable, as applied science, rather: 
through practice-informed phenomenological investigation, the qualities within sonification practice are sought. 
As consequence of investigative sonification practice, temporality is given specific address, and interrogation of 
compositional miniatures is referenced in order to critically and reflectively evaluate temporality as of essence to 
music’s inherent qualitative attributes, whilst simultaneously considering the substantial difference in existential 
and temporal status between audio and corporeal spatial occupancy in terms of their homogeneity. Subsequently, 
the paper is indicative of a requirement for further study of sonification within creative music practice, and it 
speculates as to the affect upon composition as consequence of orientation of sonified objects within the same 
spatial environment, thus: sonification of occupant corporeal spatial occupancies, or, phrased simply: the 
compositional potential of multiple sonifications. 
Within my praxis, the sonification of corporeal spatial occupancy is primarily concerned with 
semblance: what Merleau-Ponty (1968) differentiates from “body schema” as “body image” or 
the perceptible form of an object, especially when distinct from its object reality. Semblance, 
whilst seemingly abstract, adheres to those principles characteristic of sonification, specifically 
the first condition of Hermann’s definition, which states: “A technique that uses data as input, 
and generates sound signals… may be called sonification, if and only if [the] sound reflects 
objective properties or relations in the input data.” Yet for numerous (and in many cases valid) 
reasons, much sonification practice fails to adhere to this condition; the sonified object is 
considered so far as its spatiality is concerned; yet to truly reflect objective properties, and for 
semblance, the object should be considered as it exists spatiotemporally. However, sonification 
that engages with the principles of semblance (thereby reflecting objective properties of the 
sonified object) is problematic within creative arts practice by complication of the apparent 
limit upon qualitative compositional decisions. Here we consider sonification praxis from a 
philosophical perspective, specifically: through a dialogic process of music practice and 
existential phenomenology, so to contribute to the fields of philosophy and auditory display, 
and to the wider remit of music praxis. 
Semblance: The Perceptual Immanence 
of Corporeal Spatial Occupancy 
What is the existential status of corporeal spatial occupancy? It is understood that corporeal 
spatial occupancy that is of constancy in its external conscious perceptibility (its outward 
appearance) and its spatial-temporality is toward Object Reality. Merleau-Ponty states: 
In all of its appearances, the object preserves its invariable characteristics and itself remains invariable, 
and it is an object because all of the possible values that it could assume in terms of size and form are 
contained in advance in the formula of its relations with the context. (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 314) 
Maintaining this, Merleau-Ponty’s reflection that “the constancy of relations is grounded in the 
evidentness of the thing” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 315) is of significance to the discussion and 
process of sonification. One could observe that with altered context and history, Merleau-
Ponty’s statements present sonification praxis with learned clarity. As a differentiation between 
external perceptual consciousness and spatial-temporality, Merleau-Ponty’s statement 
facilitates consideration beyond existential status within Object Reality: existential status of 
corporeal spatial occupancy within phantasy, image consciousness, and memory, within 
realities. In doing so, the complex phenomena of sonification is uncovered. Many experience 
phantasy yet it is those deemed as creative or innovative who bring theirs forth as perceptual 
immanence. Critique of the above statement is not laboured; it is bold and romantic in its 
apparent location within creative arts practice, yet it demonstrates Husserlian phantasy and 
provides differentiation from likewise internal apprehensions, such as image consciousness, 
and memory. Phantasy then, in the context of music practice, is composition realised, or heard 
internally, prior to any external realisation. As recognised by Husserl, phantasy is warrant of 
analysis: despite being an apprehension of objectivities (akin to perception) it is essentially 
subjective and embodied, in lieu of which, questions arise with regards to its status post-
external realisation. If phantasy is brought forth as perceptual immanence, does its status 
remain subjective? Does it maintain the status of phantasy at all? Those questions lead toward 
one of substantial significance within this study: if that which is brought forth as perceptual 
immanence pre-exists as perceptual immanence (as corporeal spatial occupancy), yet has 
existed neither as perceptual immanence nor as phantasy, is it the pre-existing perceivable 
phenomenon? To clarify: if audio is composed through data mapping of corporeal spatial 
occupancy and subsequent allocation of data to audio parameters therefore has no previous 
existence as audio within external space and time or internal phantasy, to what extent is the 
realised audio of the corporeal spatial occupancy? To what extent can a sonification be of the 
same essential qualities as that which is sonified? To the extent of semblance! 
At this stage, it is of value to distinguish the discussed entities of audio, sonification and 
corporeal spatial occupancy, through terminological congruence with phenomenological 
discourse, and in doing so, to allow some of the previous and potential questions to become 
redundant. Differentiating phantasy presentation and physical imagination yet recognising 
them as parallel cases, Husserl defines entities of physical imagination in terms of image 
perception. Although of vast difference in perceptual immanence and constancy, congruence 
is found with audio in terms of externality: 
We have three objects: 1) the physical image, the physical thing made from canvas, marble, and so on; 
2) the representing or depicting object; and 3) the represented or depicted object. For the latter, we prefer 
to say simply “image subject”; for the first object, we prefer “physical image”; for the second, 
“representing image” or “image object.” (Husserl 2005, 21) 
Thereby, positioning Husserl’s distinctions in the audio-musical domain (and in interest of 
clarity): 
1. Audio that is externally perceived within space is referred to as “physical image”; 
2. Audio that is a sonification is referred to as “image object”; 
3. Corporeal spatial occupancy is referred to as “image subject”. 
However, physical imagination is then concerned with predisposition; it is an internal 
realisation that is a re-presentation of an external entity. Phantasy exists without having a 
previous object reality of its own; it is image subject sans or prior to image object and physical 
image. Thus, sonification understood as image subject requires externality beyond that of 
physical image — it does not exist as image consciousness, nor does phantasy, rather it is 
precisely existential semblance. The semblance encountered within a sonification is recognised 
as essentially phenomenological in lieu of the observation that there is absence of internality 
within the process. Sonification is essentially as Heidegger (1927, 58) states: “to let that which 
shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” In many 
cases, what is understood as artistic creativity — phantasy brought forth — does not exist 
within this process. Rather, it is through the definition of the methodical construct of a 
sonification and the relationship it has with corporeal spatial occupancy that that which is 
brought forth, is. 
The Problems of Semblance 
Adhering to true semblance is problematic in regards to æsthetic engagement with a realised 
sonification of corporeal spatial occupancy. Existing all at once in its spatial occupancy, an 
object shares this same property within its temporal occupancy, whereby the data, no matter its 
numerical value upon a three-dimensional axis, exists simultaneously. True semblance dictates 
that however liberal the choice of duration for the realised sonification, sonification that 
adheres to semblance, or to Hermann’s (2008) definition, must be realised as a single static 
chord. Discrepancies with regards to the implications of semblance upon validity of 
compositional praxis were illuminated subsequent to a period of critical reflection upon my 
own compositional outputs. Reflection evidenced that Sedemus (2012) and Sedere, Audire 
(2013) were fundamentally flawed in their pursuit of an audio realisation of non-audio 
objective properties of semblance. Their methods utilised duration as a compositional 
parameter to facilitate reading of the object (for example, from left to right). Thereby, duration 
was enabled as a parameter and facilitated the musical quality of unfolding. However, the 
musical qualities were demonstrated at the expense of invalidation of the “image subject” — 
because image subject exists spatiotemporally and reflection of the objective properties would 
need to exist simultaneously. 
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By utilising duration to acquire musical unfolding, Sedemus and Sedere, Audire depict the 
image subject as unfolding with each second of audio depicting an aspect of the object in 
sequence (akin to Magnetic Resonance Imaging [MRI]). These works thereby reflect objects 
within spatial succession and not the true spatiotemporal homogeneity of the objects. The 
direction of reading and the use of duration as a parameter impose spatiality upon time. 
Philosophical engagement with sonification that demonstrates the image subject as unfolding 
warrants study of the work of Franz Brentano as well as Husserl’s (1991b, 29) subsequent 
elucidation, namely “The Diagram of Time”. Sonification that utilises the same methodical 
construct as Sedemus and Sedere, Audire demonstrates the running-off phenomena of the 
theory of time; aptly, Husserl locates his analogy within musical melody when he states: “When 
the new tone is sounding, the preceding tone has not disappeared without leaving a trace. If it 
had, we would be quite incapable of noticing the relations among the successive tones” 
(Ibid., 11). To elucidate: running-off phenomena within the perception of time are evident 
when engaging with a melody within a given key; the key is only defined when the tonic, 
dominant and median are heard in any sequence. The notes that are no longer present or 
sounding are maintained within consciousness [1 . Interestingly, duration as consciousness of 
engagement is not whole, because when time’s running-off phenomena is considered in terms of Dasein’s 
Being — as-lived — previous notes are maintained in memory and this is evident as the sudden consciousness (or 
abstract conceptualisation) of any “wrong” note within a melody.], otherwise one would not perceive the 
key of the music. Whilst representing the continua of the running-off phenomena of (the 
perception of) time, such sonification demonstrates discrepancies with regards to semblance 
insofar as it misrepresents the continua of spatial relations within time as successive. Therein, 
spatial past is contained within time, whereas corporeal spatial occupancy exists 
simultaneously within the ever-present. It is the imposition of duration as a period of conscious 
engagement that begets this misrepresentation. In duration, engagement acts as an abstract 
conceptualisation of objects and thereby reduces them. Rather it is through a priori experience 
akin to Bergson’s metaphysical — “intuition” (1903) and Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenological — “as-lived” (1927) — that knowledge is “to the things themselves.” 
When sonification adheres to semblance (whereby realisation is heard as a single static chord) 
compositional qualities are compromised (Video 1). 
Sonification as a single static chord is problematic in terms of functionality. Concerning the 
wider remit of auditory display, differential perception of distinct data is nigh impossible; thus, 
with regards to interpretive communication, adherence to semblance renders sonification for 
this purpose inept. With regards to compositional potential, outcomes are attached to parameter 
allocation and therefore æsthetic sophistication is severely limited to the inherent sonic 
permeations within a chord. Qualitative compositional decisions (for example, where sound or 
music that exists first as heard within internal consciousness — as with Husserlian phantasy — 
is brought forth as perceivable externality) are discounted in favour of integrity of process 
towards quantifiable outcome. In this manner, sonification is an Objective creative praxis. The 
success of any sonification is quantifiable as representational accuracy, adherence to 
methodical construct, reflection of Objective properties, and as semblance. Yet, despite the 
apparent inconveniences of semblance — specifically in the representation of temporal 
occupancy in the sonification of corporeal spatial occupancy — there remains substance and 
quality within this praxis beyond integrity of process and truth in representational accuracy. 
Sonification as Quantifiable 
Speculating about the extent to which sonification is quantifiable as a reflection of Objective 
properties poses numerous questions. Those questions pertaining to method and process can be 
addressed with clarity. However, it is the realised audio, the image object, for which the 
supposition of quantification presents deeper issues. Qualitative appreciation of audio is 
predominantly subsumed to æsthetics wherein much discussion regarding differentiation of 
sound from music is obstructed by deviations toward positions of subjective æsthetical 
interpretation; perhaps understandably, given the oft passionate subjectivity associated with 
music. Differentiation of sound from music is of pertinence within the wider remit of 
sonification praxis but the qualitative orientation of sonification as semblance pertains 
specifically to spatial-temporality and this shifts focus from æsthetics to existential 
phenomenology and metaphysics. 
The assertion of the presence of qualitative attributes within a practice for which quantifiable 
outcome is tantamount is of apparent disparity. It is of value to enter into discussion of quality 
and quantity to permit discourse that addresses semblic sonification in terms of reality, or 
realities. Heidegger’s footnoted address of what he deems to be the failings of Henri Bergson 
(in addition to those of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and Husserl by association) is concerned with 
the observation that Bergson’s temporal analysis is preceded by an analysis of number; thereby 
Bergson’s statement that time is of qualitative succession is in fact a statement that time is of 
quantitative succession (Heidegger 1927). Within his address, Heidegger states his intention to 
elucidate his objections to Bergson’s temporal philosophy within part two of Being and 
Time. [2 . Heidegger never completed the second part of Being and Time.] Despite this inconvenience, 
Heidegger’s position, that time is of quality to the extent of being unquantifiable and irreducible 
to numerical measurement, resonates with the position explicated by Bergson’s (1889) “pure 
duration” and his own (1903) “intuition”. For Bergson, knowledge through analysis is relative 
as opposed to absolute; in reducing corporeal spatial occupancy to data-based representation, 
the object in its actuality is invalidated, and what is gained is knowledge of an abstract 
conceptualisation of the object, as opposed to the object as absolute. Sonification as semblance 
is not toward absolute knowledge; rather its purpose is specifically to contribute relative 
knowledge from the position of audio. It is therefore recognised that discrepancies with regards 
to the audio realisation of non-audio data are innate. However, the heterogeneous hierarchy of 
object space (quantity) and time (quality) is impermanent: spatial data realised as audio data 
may rather be described as spatial data in time realised as temporal data in space. Therefore, 
the innate discrepancies should not serve as justification for a resignation to relative knowledge 
in stasis. Sonification practice concerned with the audio realisation of corporeal spatial 
occupancy should endeavour to revise its methods to better lay claim to its conditions of 
definition, thereby augmenting the integrity of the practice. Such sonification is knowledge 
relative to the invalidation of the sonified object, as it exists spatiotemporally, whereas 
sonification that adheres to semblance is relative knowledge — relative to the innate 
discrepancies imposed by the dominating concept of the space-time continuum. 
Sonification as Semblance 
Therefore, without invalidating the object as it exists spatiotemporally, what is the qualitative 
potential of sonification as semblance? To address the preservation of the image subject as it 
exists spatiotemporally, credence is given to the appreciation that the non-audio data is (as with 
the previous imposition of hierarchy) primarily spatial and the audio data primarily temporal. 
When temporality is utilised as a parameter to enable qualitative compositional decisions, it is 
exploited as a contrivance that amounts to a sequential arrangement of properties within 
duration; duration is not an audio parameter, rather it is a facilitator, a container for 
engagement. Therefore, in the first instance, the method for the realisation of semblic 
sonification cannot use duration (of temporality) as a parameter; thereby, semblic sonification 
is composed of chord(s). To an extent, compositional potential arises upon the sonification of 
multiple occupancies within the same spatial environment; manipulation of spatial forms 
facilitates the compositional realisation of complex harmonies. However, such composition is 
subject to temporal limitations: as static chord there is no change beyond those inherent 
permeations within sonic relationships — parameter values are unchanged for the duration. If 
music unfolds within time — i.e. sound parameter values are unfolding, and therefore changing 
within a given duration facilitate musicality — it is then change that occurs within duration 
that permits the liberation of qualitative compositional decisions. 
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Thus, in returning to spatial occupancy it is locational change, or rather motion within time, 
that facilitates the unfolding and therefore sonification of musical qualities, and it does so 
whilst reflecting objective properties and adhering to semblance (Video 2). 
Temporality is an existential essential for both sound and music but, notably, it is only when 
sonification takes account of temporality that its sonority becomes indisputably musical. It is 
potential for change that facilitates the demonstration of qualities and leads to the suggestion 
that temporality is the essence of music. My praxis posits temporality as of qualities yet the 
credence placed upon temporality is founded upon phenomenological analyses of spatiality, 
hitherto leading to disparities. Furthermore, spatial and temporal data are presented as 
(interpreted from) numerical quantification and, whilst duration is cited as relatively arbitrary 
in that it is a period of engagement with the unquantifiable quality of presence, it is 
simultaneously rejected as a position from which to accumulate knowledge. Duration presents 
further issues, given its significance upon the introduction of motion, and perhaps there is room 
for some debate as to whether duration is a spatial phenomenon. Upon the imposition of 
duration as a parameter (recognized as the instance that it enters conscious account and is no 
longer perceived to be as-lived), does it transcend its apparent location within temporal 
phenomena toward spatiality? 
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